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1  introDuction1
Only flows to countries that are on the DAC list of recipients can be labelled Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). The countries on that list however are a mixed bag. Based 
on a World Bank classification, the DAC list for instance includes Burundi, with an income per 
capita in 2009 of $150, and Brazil, with an income per capita in 2009 of $ 8840. Burundi, on this 
count, is 59 times poorer than Brazil. And there is not just income. Burundi is small, landlocked, 
politically  and  institutionally  unstable,  with  an  unimpressive  record  in  terms  of  economic 
growth, a modest player in Africa and an insignificant player in the world. Brazil by contrast is 
huge, rich in natural resources, technologically sophisticated, growing fast, ambitious, and a 
major player on the world scene. Recently, it has even started to think about setting up its own 
aid agency (The Economist, 2011a). How more heterogeneous can one get? One can pick similar 
contrasting pairs from the DAC list, such as DRCongo and China, or Niger and India. How much 
aid, in pursuit of which development objectives, addressing which constraints in which sectors, 
using which modalities and channels: surely no single strategy can fit such dissimilar realities. 
What constitutes a sensible donor strategy in one country may be very inadequate in another. A 
differentiated strategy is called for.
Many donors have explicit strategies to help answer such questions. Belgium has 
no policy document guiding its decisions, and was advised by the 2010 DAC Peer Review to 
fill this gap. This background study provides an input in the elaboration of such a diversified 
strategy. It looks at how development cooperation with middle-income countries differs from 
that with poorer countries. 
Although some 42% of all bilateral ODA of DAC members in 2008-2009 is destined 
to middle income countries, it is difficult to find information on the rationale and modalities of 
development cooperation with MICs that goes beyond the usual donor rhetoric. Donors have 
plenty of publicly available documents that explain convincingly why and how they help low 
income countries. In contrast, aid to MICs seems to be the aid that dare not speak its name. 
Given the dearth of publicly available strategic documents, this study mostly focuses on more 
generic donor documents and on the academic literature. 
In section two we look at the different definitions that are being used for MICs. In 
section three we illustrate to what extent MICs differ from LICs. The analysis suggests important 
dimensions policy makers must take into account when devising a MIC strategy. In the fourth 
section we look at substantive arguments for donors to provide aid to MICs, notwithstanding 
the fact that they are on average better off than their LIC cousins. The fifth section argues that 
the aid effectiveness agenda, and in particular the Paris Declaration, was not conceived with the 
MICs in mind, and what the lessons are from this analysis when conceiving a MIC strategy. The 
sixth section briefly describes how a number of donors have differentiated their development 
cooperation towards their partner countries.  The final section lists the main conclusions.
[1]  This discussion paper is part of a background study commissioned by the Belgian Directorate General of 
Development  Cooperation  (DGD).  The  study  was  produced  by  the  “O*Platform  on  Aid  Effectiveness  and  Aid 
Architecture” at the Institute of Development Policy and Management (IOB), University of Antwerp, with funding 
from the Flemish Interuniversity Council (VLIR).Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 7 
2  Definition mics
2.1	 The	World	Bank	classification
Alleviating poverty constitutes the primary official justification for providing aid, 
and an obvious and readily available indicator of well-being at country level is income per capita. 
For this reason bilateral and multilateral aid agencies all tend to use country rankings by income 
(or by criteria that are largely income-based) as an important criterion to justify their selection 
of beneficiary countries (Harris et al., 2009). Multilateral Development Banks, in particular, use 
per capita income as a key parameter to guide the volumes and terms of assistance provided. 
The World Bank has played a leading role in income-based country classifications that have 
provided inspiration for many other donors. For this reason, we start our search for definitions 
at the World Bank.
The primary World Bank criterion for classifying economies is gross national income 
(GNI) per capita, measured in US dollars, and calculated using the World Bank Atlas method2.  
Based on this measure, the classifications used since July 2011 are (World Bank fiscal year 2012, 
using 2010 data): 
•  Low income countries3 (LIC): ≤ US$1,005 per capita (35 countries)
•  Middle Income countries (MIC): US$ 1,006 - US$12,275 per capita (110 countries) 
•  High income countries (HIC): ≥ 12,276 per capita. (70 countries) 
As the MIC-category is very broad, with those at the top of the band over 12 times wealthier than 
those at the bottom, it is further broken down into two subgroups: 
•  Lower middle income countries (LMIC): US$1,006 – US$3,975 per capita (56  
        countries) 
•  Upper middle income countries (UMIC): US$3.976 – US$12,275 per capita (54  
        countries)
The classifications are updated annually to incorporate the effect of international inflation. 
Studying country categories over time should be done with caution. The evolution 
of the number of countries in any given category is in fact the compound effect of two dynamics: 
new countries being included in the statistics and countries being reclassified. Between 1989 and 
the mid-nineties, the overall number of countries in the World Bank data increased considerably 
due to the emergence of newly independent states (former USSR and Yugoslavia) and the 
classification of countries that were not listed before (e.g. due to a lack of data). The increase 
in LICs and MICs during that period can therefore be largely explained by the inclusion of new 
[2]  The World Bank’s official estimates of countries’ relative economic size are based on GNI, which is converted 
to US dollars using the Atlas Method. The Atlas Method uses three-year averages of a country’s exchange rate. An 
alternative conversion method is the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) method. The PPP method starts from the finding 
that the purchasing power of 1 US$ differs from country to country and therefore takes into account the number of 
units of a country’s currency that is required to buy the same amount of goods and services in another country. For a 
number of reasons, even a free market exchange rate does not naturally expresses PPPs. Because of the high time and 
cost and time involved in organising detailed price surveys, PPP numbers are not available on an annual basis, but 
only for every 3-5 years. For intermediary years, values are extrapolated.  Nor are PPPs available for all countries.
The GNI of developing countries measured in PPP terms generally exceeds their GNI using the Atlas method. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the relatively low prices of non-traded goods in developing countries have an impact on 
the PPP measure, but not on the Atlas conversion.
[3]  The income classifications are used for all 187 World Bank member countries and other economies with popula-
tions of more than 30,000 (213 in total). We use the general abbreviation of low income country, incorporating also low 
income economies that are not countries.8 • IOB working Paper 2011-11  Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries 
countries rather than by a reclassification of existing countries. 
From the middle of the nineties onwards, the total number of countries has however 
remained stable. Figure 1 illustrates how throughout the nineties the number of LICs increased 
to a peak of 66 in 2003: 
Figure 1: Geographical composition of LICs4
Source:	authors’	calculations	based	on	World	Bank	Country	and	Lending	Groups	FY	2012
Over the following years, the number of LICs fell by nearly halve to 35 by 2012. 
Figure 1 further shows the geographical concentration of LICs over time. Overall, the amount 
of LICs is at a historical low level for every regional group. However, while in nearly all regions 
an appreciable number of countries have been graduating from the LIC-status (between 1 and 3 
remaining per category5), there are still 29 LICs left in SSA. 
The number of MICs underwent an inverse evolution: a stabilisation and a slight 
decrease during the nineties, from 109 in 1994, to 87 in 2004, and an increase during the last 
decade, up to 110 in 2012: 
[4]  Geographical classifications are based on World Bank classifications. The remaining countries were classified 
by the authors. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa; EAP: East Asia & Pacific; SAS: South Asia; ECA: Europe & Central Asia; LAC: 
Latin America & Caribbean; MNA: Middle East and North Africa
[5]  EAP: Cambodia, Korea, Laos, Myanmar and Solomon Islands; ECA: Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan; LAC: Haiti; 
MNA: no country left; SAS: Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Nepal.Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 9 
Figure 2: Geographical composition of MICs
Source:	authors’	calculations	based	on	World	Bank	Country	and	Lending	groups	FY	2012.
Overall, the figure illustrates an increase in the number of MICs, up to an all-time 
high of 110. Looking at the different geographical categories, SSA shows an important progress, 
from 10 a decade ago, up to 21 MICs today. 
2.2  Other performance rankings and indicators
Although income-based classifications capture many elements of development, 
other useful indicators are available: 
1.  State Fragility
Fragile states 6 are not to be confused with LICs. The 2009 list of fragile and con-
flict-affected states (FCAS) of the DAC for instance contains in total 43 countries, including 26 
of the 43 LICs, but also 16 LMICs and 1 HIC7  (DAC, 2010). It is presented in table 1. As the list is 
a compilation of three lists of fragility, countries are marked in bold when they are common to 
all three lists:
Table 1: Fragile and Conflict Affected States (DAC)
Low-income	countries
Afghanistan,	Burundi,	Central	African	Republic,	Chad, Comoros,	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo,	Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea,	Guinea-Bissau,	Haiti, Kenya, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, North Korea, Rwan-
da,	Sierra	Leone, Somalia,	Tajikistan, Togo, Uganda, Republic of Yemen, Zimbabwe
Lower	Middle-income	countries
Angola, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Côte	d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Iraq, Kiribati, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New 




[6]  Unless otherwise states, we use the list of fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) of the DAC, a compilation 
of three lists: The World Bank’s CPIA list (≤3.2), the Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World and 
the Carleston University Country Indicators for Foreign Policy.
[7]  Based on 2008-data10 • IOB working Paper 2011-11  Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries 
Not  all  LICs  are  thus  fragile  (e.g.  the  Belgian  partner  countries  Benin,  Mali, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Senegal are not), while many fragile countries are not-LIC (e.g. the 
Belgian partner West Bank and Gaza):
2.  Least Developed Countries
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) category was established by the UN in 1971. 
It preceded the human development index (HDI) in its effort to look beyond income per capita 
criteria. Although the HDI is conceptually better developed and annually available, the LDC 
categorisation is still being used (see e.g. the 2011 LDC-conference in Istanbul). In the upcoming 
debate, the classification will remain important, given the goal to halve the number of LDC from 
48 today (see Istanbul Declaration in United Nations, 2011). 
The criteria for LDCs are therefore (for the latest triennial review of 2009): 
•  Extreme poverty: low-income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate 
of the gross national income (GNI) per capita (under $905 for inclusion, above $ 
1,086 for graduation);
•  A lack of human capital: a composite Human Assets Index (HAI) based on 
indicators of: (a) nutrition: percentage of population undernourished; (b) health: 
mortality  rate  for  children  aged  five  years  or  under;  (c)  education:  the  gross 
secondary school enrolment ratio; and (d) adult literacy rate
•  Economic vulnerability:  a  composite  Economic  Vulnerability  Index  (EVI) 
based on indicators of: (a) population size; (b) remoteness; (c) merchandise export 
concentration; (d) share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in gross domestic 
product; (e) homelessness owing to natural disasters; (f) instability of agricultural 
production; and (g) instability of exports of goods and services. 
Large economies are excluded by a limit on population size of 75 million. Currently, 
there are 48 LDCs: 33 African countries, 14 Asian and 1 Caribbean; or 30 of the 35 LICs, 17 LMICs 
and 1 HIC. 
To qualify for graduation, a country must meet the thresholds for two of the three 
criteria in two consecutive triennial reviews. Since the LDC category was established, only three 
countries have graduated: Botswana in 1994, Cape Verde in 2007 and the Maldives in 2011. Given 
the fact that there are quite some middle income countries among the LDCs, and that it is the 
intention to halve the number of countries in the LDC list by 2020, names of potential candidates 
to graduate circulate, such has Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Samoa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 11 
3.  Human Development
In 1990, the UN established the human development index (HDI), a composite 
index of education, health and income measures. 
To illustrate the difference between the HDI and income per capita, figure 3 below 
plots human development8  against GNI per capita. The dotted lines mark the different income 
categories:  LIC,  LMIC,  UMIC  and  HIC  and  the  different  human  development  levels:  low, 
medium, high and very high. The graphs reveals that within the category of middle-income 
countries, there is considerable variation in per capita levels of human development. 
Figure 3: Contrasting human development with income per capita, all developing countries
Source:	authors’	calculations	based	on	World	Development	Indicators	and	Human	Development	Indicator
Figure 4 is comparable to figure 3, but only shows Belgian Partner countries:
[8]  In order to avoid spurious autocorrelation, we limit the human development measure in our calculations to a 
weighted indicator of education (25% mean years of schooling and 25% expected years of schooling) and health (50% 
life expectancy at birth).12 • IOB working Paper 2011-11  Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries 
Figure 4: Contrasting human development with income per capita, Belgian partner countries
Source:	authors’	calculations	based	on	World	Development	Indicators	and	Human	Development	Indicator	
Senegal and Vietnam, two countries that reached MIC-status in 2011 and have a 
similar level of GNI per capita (Senegal 1,040, Vietnam 930), score very different on the other 
dimensions of the Human Development Index: Senegal 152th  and Vietnam 109th, while MICs 
with similar HDI such as Bolivia (86th) and Ecuador (72th)  have very different income levels 
(Bolivia: 1,630 and Ecuador: 3,970). Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 13 
Table 2 below contrasts the two UN-categorisations: LDC and HDI. 
Table 2: Constrasting LDC with
Low HDI Medium HDI No HDI
LDC Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Yemen, Haiti
Sao tome and Principe, Equatorial 
Guinea,









Non-LDC Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, 
Papua New Guinea, Cameroon, 
Ghana, Kenya
Republic of Congo, Pakistan, 
Swaziland, India, Cape Verde, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Morocco, 
Vietnam, Tajikistan, Syrian Arab 
Republic, South Africa, Kyrgyzstan, 
Indonesia, Maldives, Honduras, 
Namibia, Guyana, Micronesia, 
Uzbekistan, Egypt, Mongolia, 
Moldova, Botswana, Philippines, 
Paraguay, Bolivia, Suriname, 
Gabon, Thailand, Sri Lanka, 
El Salvador, China, Dominican 
Republic, Turkmenistan, Fiji
	 Source:	UN	lists	of	LDCs	(2009)	and	HDI	(2010)
The fact that quite some LDC are medium HDI illustrates the discrepancy between 
the two UN concepts, and also suggests that these countries may well graduate from the LDC-
category in the short future. 
2.3	DAC	list	of	aid	recipients
Historically, the OECD-DAC list of countries and territories eligible to receive ODA 
has not always been based on objective indicators of need or aid effectiveness. Instead, the 
list was negotiated and renegotiated among DAC members on the basis of a combination of 
geographical  criteria  and  development  criteria.  Geopolitical  considerations  also  played  an 
important role. Israel for instance remained on the list until 1997, even if this was not justified 
by any objective development related indicator (e.g. at least since 1989 it has been a HIC in the 
World bank classification).  14 • IOB working Paper 2011-11  Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries 
The list currently used by the DAC however is based on stricter set of criteria.  
      The criteria are: 
•  All countries on the lists of least developed countries from the UN are included
•  So are the low and middle income countries from the World Bank list
•  Members  of  the  G8  (Russia),  EU  (Bulgaria,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland  and 
Romania), and countries with a firm date for entry into the EU are excluded
•  A number of small island territories (Nauru, Niue, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna, 
Anguilla, Cook Islands, Montserrat, Nauru, St-Helena) have been added. 
To avoid regular reclassification of countries and acknowledging the difficulties of 
arbitrarily cutting off continuous variables, HICs are only excluded from the list once they have 
exceeded the HIC-income threshold for three consecutive years. For this reason, Equatorial 
Guinea (graduated FY 09), Oman (graduated FY 09), Trinidad and Tobago (graduated FY 08) and 
Barbados (graduated FY 08) are still in the current list that was made up in August 2009 and is 
used for flows of 2009 and 2010. Antigua, which is included in the list, was UMIC until FY 06, 
than graduated to HIC and became again UMIC from FY 11 onwards. Kosovo, although not yet 
included in the World Bank list, is classified as LMICs since FY 10. 
2.4	 Volatility	of	income	classifications
Development is not necessarily an unbroken upward trend towards the status 
of high income country, at which point in time donor and partner countries establish a new 
relationship fully based on reciprocity. Although certain countries in East Asia have followed a 
consistent upward trend, many countries have a more chequered history:
Table 3: Income status transitions
Over the last 20 years 29 countries have fallen back from MIC to LIC status. Only 4 of those are still in 
the LIC status 
Movement Number of countries  Examples
MIC to LIC without return 4 Korea, Dem. Rep; Kyrgyz Republic; Ta-
jikistan; Zimbabwe
MIC to LIC to MIC 22 China, Indonesia, Egypt, Angola, Sen-
egal, Nicaragua, Honduras, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Armenia, Equatorial 
Guinea (even HIC now)
MIC to LIC to MIC to LIC to MIC 2 Albania, Georgia




Among the countries that graduated to MIC-status over the past decade, the 
majority had reached that income categoryonce  before, but subsequently regressed to LIC-
status (Glennie, 2011). Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 15 
Besides those countries that effectively graduate and fall back, there are a number 
of countries that seem stuck around the LIC/MIC borderline, like for example Bolivia (LMIC 
since before 1989). 
Development is thus more complex than one categorisation, based on income, and 
the assumption of uninterrupted progress once the MIC threshold is achieved, can capture. 
Some MICs face a high degree of fragility or show less progress in other development indicators, 
while some LICs might fare much better on these other indicators, showing much better future 
prospects for broad-based development. 
Overall, the LIC/MIC graduation level is an arbitrary cut-off based on a single 
indicator of development. This is one of the reasons why donors often look at more development 
indicators (Sweden, for example on 20 indicators) to set up their country categories. 16 • IOB working Paper 2011-11  Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries 
3  how Do mics Differ from lics?
MICs  are  a  heterogeneous  group.  There  are  differences  among  them  in  their 
economic, political and social characteristics, and in the development challenges they face. 
Although  diversified  by  their  individual  characteristics,  there  are  nevertheless  important 
dimensions in which they significantly differ as a group in comparison to LICs. In this section 
we focus on those mean differences that have implications for strategic donor decisions  on aid 
volume and modalities.
3.1	 Average	personal	consumption
The difference between LICs and MICs is clearly illustrated in table 4 where we 
present average personal consumption per capita per day9: 
Table 4: GNI per capita, using PPP (2009)
Low	income	Countries 2.61
Lower middle income countries 6.55
Upper middle income countries 21.13
Middle	income	countries 9.77
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.61 Senegal 4.12
Burundi 0.97 Vietnam 5.04
Niger 1.45 Morocco 6.87
Mozambique 2.03 Bolivia 7.68
Tanzania 2.31 Algeria 9.11
Uganda 2.48 Peru 14.24
Mali 2.51 Ecuador 15.31
Rwanda 2.51 South Africa 16.52
Benin 3.23
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	World	Development	Indicators,	World	Bank
The table shows that on average household consumption in MICs is nearly four 
times larger than in LICs. Internal redistribution of all household income would in countries 
such as DRC and Burundi leave the whole population below the US$1.25 poverty line. This 
suggests that internal redistribution, however radical, only contributes marginally to combating 
poverty in those countries. Poverty reduction will have to rely on international redistribution and 
especially on higher rates of economic growth which has historically shown to be the effective 
strategy by far. 
Before we proceed, it is important to ask whether the income measure of poverty 
(US$ 1.25) is a good proxy for measuring deprivation in non-income dimensions. The table below 
shows the global distribution of different poverty measures: 
Table 5: Global Distribution of world’s poor (percentage) by various measures, 2007-2008
GNI per cap-











MIC 72%  56%  71%  71%  70% 
LIC  28%  39%  28%  28%  29% 
Source:	Sumner,	2010a
[9]  Instead of GNI measured by using the World Bank Atlas Method, we use here the Purchasing Power Parity. This 
measure converts GNI to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates, and is a more adequate reflection 
of differences in living standards.Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 17 
With the exception of children out of school, there is little difference between 
different poverty measures and the global poverty distribution generated. This suggests that 
poverty has broadly similar effects on manifestations of non-income deprivation in MICs and 
LICs. 
Alonso et al. (2007 in Glennie, 2011) also find a clear relationship between higher 
income per capita and higher human development indicators. The only exceptions to this general 
rule are inequality and higher education, where there is no statistical difference between LICs 
and MICs. 
3.2	 Aid	
Table 6 below illustrates how ODA is allocated over income categories: 
Table 6: ODA received by income category (per capita and as % of GNI of recipient country), 2007-2009
ODA per capita (US$) ODA as % of GNI
LDCs 27.42 5.20




The table shows that ODA is relatively much less important for MICs compared to 
LDCs and remaining LICs. This gives donors less leverage in MICs, both collectively as well as 
individually, than they have in LICs. 
Relatively less aid does not necessarily mean less fragmentation. On the basis of its 
Country Programmable Aid (CPA) measures10, the DAC has calculated the fragmentation ratio 
on the basis of two tests, one from the perspective of the donor and one from the perspective of 
the recipient (DAC, 2009a): 
1.  Does  the  donor  provide  a  higher  percentage  of  this  recipient’s  aid  than  it 
provides of total global aid? 
2.  Is the donor among the larger donors that together account for at least 90% of 
this recipient’s aid? 
Using these criteria, four types of aid relationship can be distinguished: 
Table 7: Four types of aid relationships
Yes to Question 1 No to question 1
Yes to Question 2 A.	Concentrated	and	important C.	Important
No to question 2 B.	Concentrated D.	Non-significant
Source:	DAC,	2009a
[10]  CPA is defined through exclusions, by subtracting from gross ODA aid that is unpredictable by nature (humani-
tarian aid and debt forgiveness and reorganisation), entails no cross-border flows (development research in donor 
country, promotion of development awareness, imputed student costs, refugees in donor country and administra-
tive costs), does not form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid and aid extended by 
local governments in donor countries), is not country programmable by the donor (core funding to national NGOs 
and International NGOs), or is not susceptible for programming at country level (e.g. contributions to Public Private 
Partnerships, for some donors aid extended by other agencies than the main aid agency) (DAC, 2011). Although this 
measure gives a better estimate of the volume of resources transferred to developing countries, the flows it covers are 
not all imposing a burden on the limited administrative capacity of the recipient country.18 • IOB working Paper 2011-11  Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries 
Globally, 39% of donor-partner country relationships are non-significant, meaning 
that for each recipient country more than a third of its relationships with donors are non-
significant. Looking at the difference by income groups, table 8 below shows that fragmentation 
is above average in MICs, mainly LMICs:















LICs 61 1,472 474 308 180 510 35%
LMICs 47 1,064 279 199 94 492 46%
UMICs 43 565 180 139 45 201 36%
Global 151 3,101 933 646 319 1,203 39%
Source:	DAC,	2009a
3.3	 	Governance11
MICs may also differ from LICs in terms of quality of governance. A first such 
measure is the government effectiveness indicator calculated by Kaufmann et al. (2010). This 
indicator captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.” 
It is a composite index made up on the basis of 16 aggregated indicators. The following figure 
illustrates the correlation between income per capita and government effectiveness: 
Figure 5: Government Effectiveness and Income per capita 12
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	Worldwide	Governance	Indicators,	World	Bank
The graph shows a positive correlation between GNI per capita and government 
effectiveness. The average value of the index, which ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, is 0.73 higher for 
MICs than for LICs. 
[11]  We limit ourselves to two indicators that are most important from a donor viewpoint.
[12]  R² measures to what extent values on the Y-axis are explained by values on the X-axis. It takes a value between 
0 and 1. Applied to figure 5: about 34% of variation in government effectiveness is “explained” by variation in income 
per capita.Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 19 
Another indicator, voice and accountability, is designed to reflect “perceptions of 
the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media.” The figure below shows 
again a positive but weaker correlation between income and this governance indicator:
Figure 6: Voice and Accountability and Income per capita
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	Worldwide	Governance	Indicators,	World	Bank
For MICs, the average value of this indicator, which also ranges from -2.5 to +2.5, is 
0.59 point higher than for LICs.20 • IOB working Paper 2011-11  Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries 
3.4	 Public	Finance	Management
On  the  basis  of  56  PEFA  assessments,  Paolo  de  Renzio  (2009)  looked  at  the 
correlation between the quality of PFM systems13 and the income per capita of the country. In 
line with the previous findings, the correlation is positive: 
Figure 7: PEFA averages and income per capita
Source:	de	Renzio,	2009
The following table shows in more detail scores on the different PEFA-dimensions 
according to the World Bank income classifications14:
Table 9: Different PEFA dimensions and income per capita
Overall Income
LICs LMICs UMICs
Budget	Credibility 2.7 2.4 2.9 3.0
Comprehensiveness	and	Transparency 2.5 2.3 2.6 3.1





Accounting and Reporting 2.2 2.0 2.2 3.1
External	Scrutiny 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.5
OVERALL 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.8
Source:	de	Renzio,	2009
[13]  To be able to compare PEFA assessments, that are given letters (A being best, D being worst), the letters were 
converted to numerical values: A=4,;B+=3,5;B=3;…;D=1.
[14]  De Renzio uses the World Bank classifications of Financial Year 2008, using GNI per capita of 2006.Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 21 
In line with correlation shown in the graph above, the table confirms that overall 
quality of PFM systems improves with income. Looking at the 6 different budget dimensions, we 
see that performance improves in line with income for all dimensions, except for policy-based 
budgeting, on which UMICs do even worse than LICs. 
In contrast to the overall findings, we see in UMICs that the average scores do 
not tend to deteriorate the further one moves down the various phases of the budget cycle (or 
from top to bottom in table 9). De Renzio (2009) relates this to the growing focus on ‘checks and 
balances’ that is associated with higher levels of per capita income, or more simply with the fact 
that richer countries have more resources to devote to improving PFM systems. 
3.5	 Access	to	other	financial	flows
Over  the  past  decades,  official  flows  to  developing  countries  have  declined  in 
comparison with private flows (Wood et al., 2011). The figure below illustrates the importance 
of a number of resource flows to LICs, MICs, LMICs and UMICs. The resource flows which have 
been selected are ODA flows; workers’ remittances and compensations of employees; foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and portfolio equity flows; and other private medium-term and long-
term flows, meaning bond investment and bank and other commercial lending.
Figure 8: Relative importance of selected net resource flows (2009, USD millions)
Source:	Authors’	calculations	based	on	OECD-DAC	statistics	(aid	flows)	and	the	World	Bank’s	Global	Development	Finance	(GDF)	database	
(other	flows).
In the first quadrant, one can observe that for LICs, aid flows are the most important 
international resource flow. With rising income per capita, the other sources of external finance 
dramatically gain in importance. In LMICs, FDI, equity flows and worker remittances have 
overtaken aid flows as most important categories. The importance of FDI and portfolio equity 
further increases for the UMICs. In such a context, the reliance on aid is greatly reduced and aid 
should be used more selectively (Wood et al., 2011).22 • IOB working Paper 2011-11  Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries 
Although Wood et al. (2011) find that an average of 70% of global FDI to developing 
countries was concentrated in 10 MICs, figure 10 shows that there is a strong correlation between 
GDP and FDI per capita: 
Figure 9: FDI and income per capita
Source:	Dailami,	2008Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 23 
4  why give aiD to mics? 
How much aid donors give to different countries and through which modalities 
depends on the publicly professed objectives of donor governments, but also on the other, non-
development objectives they pursue, often by stealth, and on how private business interests, 
development NGOs, and other pressure groups are able to influence government agendas. From 
the late nineties onwards, the international community has exhibited a growing commitment 
to combat the major manifestations of poverty, especially in the fields of health and primary 
education, as illustrated by the 2000 Millennium Aid Consensus. This compact emerged after a 
decade of aid fatigue in the nineties and suggests that policy makers from the North had come 
to the understanding that the proper niche of aid, in comparison to other international financial 
flows, may lay in the fight against extreme poverty. In terms of geographical allocation of aid, 
this has translates in a donor discourse favouring the poorest and least developed countries. 
Table 10: Disbursement of ODA by income group (Net disbursements, 1998-99 and 2008-09 average) 15
Donor
ODA, net disbursement as % of total ODA
1998-99 2008-09




LMICs UMICs Total LDCs
Other 
LICs
Total LMICs UMICs Total
Ireland 64.8 7.2 72.0 21.2 6.8 28.0 68.2 11.3 79.5 14.0 6.5 20.5
Denmark 51.8 15.3 67.1 27.3 5.5 32.8 54.8 19.9 74.7 20.5 4.7 25.3
Canada 39.1 15.6 54.7 37.8 7.5 45.3 56.9 14.8 71.7 24.0 4.4 28.3
Norway 49.1 7.9 57.0 31.8 11.2 43.0 59.5 11.1 70.6 22.3 7.1 29.4
Nether-
lands
42.1 10.9 53.0 37.5 9.4 46.9
54.5 13.0 67.5 24.6 7.8 32.4
Finland 42.8 10.8 53.6 38.9 7.4 46.3 53.8 13.1 66.9 24.4 8.7 33.1
Sweden 43.9 13.0 56.9 35.0 8.1 43.1 53.8 13.0 66.8 27.1 6.1 33.1
Japan 17.2 16.5 33.7 60.8 5.5 66.3 40.6 25.5 66.1 26.2 7.7 33.9
United 
Kingdom
39.6 14.3 53.9 34.8 11.2 46.0
49.7 15.9 65.6 27.2 7.2 34.4
Belgium 46.2 12.5 58.7 34.3 7.0 41.3 54.2 11.2 65.4 26.9 7.6 34.6
New 
Zealand
36.9 16.8 53.7 32.9 13.4 46.3
48.4 16.3 64.7 29.2 6.1 35.3
Switzer-
land
42.5 10.7 53.2 35.8 10.9 46.7
47.5 14.8 62.3 31.9 5.8 37.7
Australia 26.5 36.5 63.0 30.6 6.4 37.0 35.1 24.5 59.6 37.6 2.9 40.4
Luxemburg 29.1 6.4 35.5 51.8 12.6 64.4 48.2 10.9 59.1 34.0 6.9 40.9
United 
States
30.4 11.3 41.7 56.7 1.6 68.3
43.4 13.2 56.6 36.6 6.8 43.4
Korea 33.8 17.7 51.5 46.7 1.8 48.5 36.9 17.1 54.0 40.0 6.0 46.0
Italy 47.6 10.5 58.1 36.7 5.2 41.9 42.2 9.5 51.7 37.1 11.3 48.4
Portugal 75.3 1.7 77.0 20.4 2.6 23.0 45.9 4.3 50.2 40.6 9.3 49.8
France 35.3 11.3 46.6 43.5 10.0 53.5 34.4 15.7 50.1 32.6 17.2 49.9
Germany 32.8 10.1 42.9 47.7 9.4 57.1 35.8 10.7 46.5 40.6 12.8 53.4
Spain 20.6 10.7 31.3 57.4 11.3 68.7 34.8 8.2 43.0 46.1 10.9 57.0
Greece 14.3 3.5 17.8 59.6 22.6 82.2 29.3 6.6 35.9 48.2 15.8 64.0
Austria 26.2 7.4 33.6 49.6 16.9 66.5 27.6 8.3 35.9 54.0 10.2 64.1
TOTAL 
DAC
31.9 13.3 45.2 47.7 7.2 54.9 43.5 14.3 57.8 33.1 9.1 42.2
Source:	DAC,	2011
[15]  Including imputed multilateral ODA and indirect cooperation and excluding amounts unspecified by country.24 • IOB working Paper 2011-11  Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries 
Data from the OECD-DAC presented in table 10 show that aid allocations have over 
the past decade become more focused on LDCs and other LICs, in line with the donor rhetoric. 
Between 1998-99 and 2008-09, the percentage of geographically allocated aid towards these 
countries increased from 45.2% to 57.8%, and this despite the fact that some important aid 
recipients like India shifted towards the MIC-status. Although aid towards MICs went down, it 
still stands at over 40%. 
Looking at the evolution at donor level, we can see that on average donors spend 
12.7% less in MICs than a decade ago. Japan has seen the largest reduction, nearly halving its aid 
to MICs from 66.3% to 33.9% in ten years, while Canada, Luxemburg, the United States, Norway 
and the Netherlands reduced their share of aid towards MICs by about one third. An opposite 
evolution is visible for Portugal that more than doubled its aid to MICs, presumably because it 
did not shift its geographical concentration away from its former colonies when some of then 
became MICs. 
In 2008-09, Greece and Austria are the countries that distribute most of their ODA 
to MICs. In both cases this is due to the economic development in the regions on which they 
focus their development cooperation, namely Middle East, North Africa and Eastern Europe. 
Next in importance are Spain, Germany, France, Portugal and Italy, where MICs get halve of the 
aid or more. In these cases, historical ties are mostly at the origin of the bilateral relations with 
MICs. Belgium is in the upper half of the ranking, with some 35% of its ODA allocated to MICs.
Anderson et al. (2004) look to the relationship between poverty focus and aid to 
MICs in the EU and its Member States. They find that there is a positive correlation between 
the amount of net ODA received by MICs and different measures of poverty. The correlation is 
however rather low (0.20-0.26), indicating that poverty was only one factor in the choice of EU 
aid volumes to MICs, and certainly not the predominant one. 
As a wider range of interests play in both receiving and giving aid to MICs, the 
reasons behind the transactions are more complex in MICs than LICs. From a development 
perspective, three normative arguments are advanced in the literature to justify aid to MICs: 
1.  Poverty reduction
2.  Global public goods
3.  Knowledge spillover effects
Besides these three major arguments, other arguments that are sometimes invoked 
include  country  vulnerability  to  slide  back,  historical  relationships,  accumulated  country 
expertise,  regional  importance  of  MICs,  or  other  aspects  of  bilateral  relationships  besides 
development cooperation, like commercial or political interests. All these have been proposed 
as additional reasons for setting up a bilateral aid relationship with MICs. In this section, we will 
consider the three most prominent reasons in more detail. Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 25 
4.1  Poverty reduction
While it is generally assumed that aid should tackle poverty, operationalising this 
concept is not straightforward. Should poor countries or poor people be targeted? 
As illustrated in the first section, the number of MICs has increased over the last 
decade. However, even with an average national average income well above the poverty line, 
there are many people in those countries who still have to live with less than $1.25. This, of 
course, has immediate consequences for the global distributions of poor people as shown in the 
following table. 
Table 11: Distribution of poor (<1,25 US$) according to income category
1988-1990 2007-2008
MICs Total (101 countries) 7% 72%
Fragile and Conflict Affected (FCAS, 16 countries, OECD)  11%
Non-FCAS 61%
LICs Total (43 countries) 93% 28%
FCAS (26 countries) 12%
Non-FCAS 16%
FCAS (43 countries) 23%
SSA 13% 27%
Source:	Sumner,	2010a
By using the most recent poverty data (<1.25US$, 2007-2008 or nearest), the table 
shows in which countries the poor live. The LIC-MIC distinction used is based on the categories 
of World Bank FY 2010 that are based on data of 2008. Since then, in FY 2011, five more countries 
have graduated to MIC status (Senegal, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Yemen) and one fell 
back to LIC status (Solomon Islands). In FY 2012, Solomon Islands re-graduated, together with 
Ghana, Laos, Mauritania and Zambia. Using 2007-2008 poverty estimates, these countries have 
54 million poor. 
The  table  shows  that  the  distribution  of  the  world’s  poor  has  changed  quite 
dramatically over the past two decades. While in the late eighties poverty was predominantly 
a problem of poor countries, and 93% of the poor lived in LICs, this assumption is no longer 
true today. In the late oughties, only 28% of the poor live in LICs (about 370 mn people) while 
72% of the poor, or about one billion people, live in MICs. Paraphrasing but also challenging 
Paul Collier´s well-known book (Collier, 2008), Andy Sumner of IDS calls them the “new bottom 
billion”. 
The poor haven’t massively moved across national borders of course. The change is 
mainly the result of countries in which many of the poor live getting richer and being reclassified. 
Several of the countries that graduated to MIC-status since 2000 contain huge populations, 
including large numbers of poor people. The most important ones have been referred to as the 
PICNIC group (Pakistan, India, China, Nigeria and Indonesia) (Sumner, 2010b). As a result of 
this about 707 million people ‘moved’ to the MIC-category. 
A further breakdown in table 11 allows us to locate the poor according to country 
fragility. We see that 77% of the poor live in stable countries, 61 in MICs and 16% in LICs. Only 26 • IOB working Paper 2011-11  Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries 
23% of the poor live in FCAS, split fairly evenly between fragile LICs and fragile MICs. No 
comparable data for the earlier period exist.
The next table shows the 10 countries with the largest numbers of poor people:
Table 12: Ten countries with highest poverty (below US$1.25, million, 2007-2008)
LIC/
MIC
Fragile Number of Poor
India MIC NO 456
China MIC NO 208
Nigeria MIC YES  89
Bangladesh LIC NO  76
Indonesia MIC NO  66
DRC LIC YES  36
Pakistan MIC YES  35
Tanzania LIC NO  30
Ethiopia LIC YES  29
Philippines  MIC NO  20
Source:	Kanbur	and	Sumner,	2011
Strikingly, of these ten countries, 6 are MICs and 6 are not fragile. 
The pockets of poverty argument, that is often advanced for providing aid to MICs, 
rests on the moral principle that assistance is called for by poverty no matter where it occurs. 
It are the poor themselves who are fundamentally important, according to this argument, not 
where they live. The countries only matter indirectly, as an indicator of where the poor might 
live. Given the current distribution of poor across LICs and MICs and the present allocation of 
ODA, this argument calls for increased ODA levels to MICs at the expense of LICs. 
In fact, if in addition to equity arguments, efficiency considerations are brought 
into the picture, it may be argued that ceteris paribus the poor in MICs should get more ODA per 
head than the poor in LICs. The argument has two versions. If donors use their aid to directly 
help the poor, for instance through conditional cash transfers, then the same dollar may bring 
more utility to the poor in a MIC. This is because the poor will increase their private expenditure, 
but in so doing will also be able to better enjoy local public goods such as transport, education, 
or drinking water, whose access is complimentary to private expenditure (Dasgupta and Kanbur, 
2005). If donors use their aid to indirectly help the poor, by strengthening the provision of public 
goods by the government, such expenditures will have a higher return in countries with better 
public provisions, such as most MICs.
The above arguments are static however, and make abstraction of the prospects of 
the poor. Paul Collier argues that poverty should not be considered as just a set of circumstances 
defined by the here and now, but should be understood in a dynamic, forward-looking sense. 
The focus of aid should not be the poor in general, but the poor who do not have any prospects 
for escaping poverty, say, within one generation. On this count, the poor in India have much 
better prospects than the equally poor in the DRC. It is indeed difficult to imagine how India 
could keep growing at the high rates projected without a corresponding reduction in poverty, 
just as China did over the past decades (Collier in IDS, 2010). Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 27 
This is the very definition that Collier proposes for the bottom billion countries: 
countries that do not provide their citizens a decent future. In his argument, the reasons are that 
such countries suffer from one or more of the following four development traps (Collier, 2008): 
•  The conflict trap. 
•  The natural resource trap.
•  The landlocked with Bad Neighbours-trap.
•  Bad Governance in a Small Country trap
The countries Collier lists are (Collier, 2009):  
Table 13: The 58 Bottom Billion Countries according to Paul Collier
Collier’s Bottom Billion
LIC MIC HIC
Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, 
Dem. Rem. Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, PDR Lao, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Angola, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Cameroon, Rep. 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Guyana, Kazakhstan, Lesotho, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Nigeria, 





What are the future prospects of poor in MICs and LICs to escape poverty? Of the 
three different ways to get out of poverty; national redistribution, international redistribution 
and economic growth, growth has historically been by far the most successful. Chandy and 
Gertz (2011) estimate that the number of poor in MICs is expected to fall at an average rate of 
11.0% a year between 2005 and 2015 thanks to growth, compared to a rate of only 3.4% for LICs. 
This corresponds to halving the poor in 7 years for MICs, while it will take 22 years in LICs. Even 
if these are very approximate estimates, the order of magnitude suggests that poverty in MICs 
is something vast numbers of people are escaping from, in ways aid has never achieved. This 
makes strong intuitive sense given that many of the poor in MICs live in countries that are on a 
path of strong and sustained economic growth (Chandy and Gertz, 2011). These authors mention 
India and China, which together lifted a staggering 475 million people out of poverty over the 
last two decades and may well lift another 187 million out of poverty by 2015. In sharp contrast, 
on the basis of domestic economic prospects, poverty in LICs is likely to endure much longer, 
and the poor there have much less hope to escape from their predicament without external help. 
Given the rapid changes in the worldwide distribution of poverty brought about by 
differentiated economic growth in different parts of the developing world, it makes good sense 
for donors contemplating changes in their geographic strategies to heed Collier´s advice and 
use a time frame stretching one or more decades. The same long term perspective is in addition 
warranted by the long lead time for aid strategies to be put in practice and to have an effect 
on the poor. Chandy and Gertz’s (2011) project future trends up to 2015, and see a number of 
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1.  As fast growth in MICs lifts large number of people out of poverty, whereas 
nothing similar is expected to happen in many LICs, at least not on the same scale, 
the share of the world’s poor residing in LICs is likely to rise gradually in the future 
from 33% in 2009 to 45% in 2015:
Figure 10: Distribution of the World’s Poor Between LICs and MICs
Source:	Chandy	and	Gertz,	2011
2.  In  line  with  this  re-concentration  of  the  poor  in  LICs,  the  geographical 
distribution of poverty is expected to shift towards SSA. As table 14 below illustrates, 
the poor were in the past mainly concentrated in three regions: East Asia, South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although SSA has registered important growth rates 
over the past decade, the growth in the Asian continent outpaces that of SSA. As 
a consequence SSA will be home to a growing share of the world’s poor, more than 
halve of the world´s poor by 2015. 
Table 14: Regional and Global Poverty  (2005-2015)
Number of poor
2005 2010 2015
Millions % Millions % Millions %
East Asia 304.5 22.8% 140.4 16.0% 53.4 9.1%
Europe and Central Asia 16.0 1.2% 8.4 1.0% 4.3 0.7%
Latin America and Caribbean 45.0 3.4% 35.0 4.0% 27.3 4.7%
Middle East and North Africa 9.4 0.7% 6.7 0.8% 5.4 0.9%
South Asia 583.4 43.6% 317.9 36.2% 145.2 24.8%
Sub-Saharan Africa 379.5 28.4% 369.9 42.1% 349.9 59.8%
World 1,337.8 878.2 585.5
Source:	Chandy	and	Gertz,	2011Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 29 
At country level, a similar evolution can be distilled:
Figure 11: The changing landscape of global poverty (2005-2015, millions of poor)
Source:	Chandy	and	Gertz,	2011
While according to the visualisation presented in Chandy and Gertz (2011) and 
reproduced in figure 12, the landscape of poverty in 2005 was a colourful geographical 
mix, it is projected to be a largely African picture by 2015. 
3.  Finally,  the  estimates  from  Chandy  and  Gertz  (2011)  predict  an  increasing 
concentration of poor in countries that are fragile or failing16. Whereas only 20% of 
the world’s poor lived in fragile states in 2005, the share is rising and is predicted 
to exceed 50% by 2014. While failed states were once assumed to be poor (see 
for example the LICUS category of the World Bank), this is no longer true today, 
challenging traditional donor intervention logics (The Economist, 2011b).
The plea to concentrate ODA on LICs, and particularly on LICs that are also fragile 
states, is not only that the poor there have much less prospect of being lifted out of poverty by 
economic growth. Another instrument, internal redistribution, is also less likely to be effective 
to help the poor, for the simple reason that there are not enough well-to-do people, from the 
middle class upwards, to tax. We have illustrated this with data on DRC and Burundi above. By 
contrast, in MICs, such possibilities do exist, and the richer the MIC, the more the argument 
applies17.
[16]  While in our own calculations we use the fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) classification of the DAC, 
these authors use the Failed States Index of the Fund for Peace, a continuous variable composed of 12 indicators 
(mounting demographic pressures, massive movements of refugees and IDPs, vengeance-seeking group grievance, 
chronic and sustained human flight, uneven development, poverty, sharp or severe economic decline, legitimacy of 
the state, progressive deterioration of public services, violation of human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, 
rise of factionalized elites, intervention of external actors).
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The foregoing analysis does not lead to a simple formula for the optimal allocation 
of aid across MICs and LICs. On the one hand the moral argument that the poor should be helped 
wherever they live, LICs or MICs, is certainly valid. It is reinforced by an efficiency argument: 
a dollar of aid spent in a MIC, whether it is channelled directly to the poor or through the 
government, may well have a higher impact on poverty reduction compared to the same dollar 
spent in a LIC. But it is impossible to say in general how much higher that higher impact will be. 
On the other hand, the poor in fragile and underperforming LICs have much bleaker prospects 
than the poor in MICs. They are and will remain for quite some time more dependent on outside 
solidarity, because two other and generally more powerful instruments to help them, namely 
internal redistribution and economic growth, are not available.   And such countries by and large 
have much less access to other sources of international finance. Whichever the optimal solution 
may be, it will certainly involve some aid being devoted to MICs.   
4.2  Global Public Goods
A second argument that can be invoked to justify aid to MICs has to do with global 
public goods such as avoiding the spread of communicable diseases, containing climate change, 
controlling drug trafficking, improving security, or maintaining global financial stability. The 
argument is that the production of global public goods will be insufficient if left to the initiative 
of individual countries . This calls for appropriate initiatives for global action through such fora 
as the UN or the G-20. Equity considerations suggest that rich countries contribute a more than 
proportionate share to the funding of such global public goods that benefit both themselves 
and poorer nations. ODA is de facto one source of such funding18. The public goods argument of 
course applies with equal strength to LICs. In fact, as they are poorer than MICs, donor countries 
are expected to contribute even more on their behalf. But the global public goods argument 
suggests that MICs should not be excluded from aid flows. There are two reasons why some of 
ODA in support of global public goods will end up being spent in MICs. First, on the basis of the 
subsidiarity principle, global (regional) public goods are most appropriately addressed at global 
(regional)  level  through  vertical,  “single  issue”  programs,  and  many  of  these  programmes 
intervene at country level. South Africa for instance is probably the country with the largest 
number of poverty stricken HIV/AIDS victims in the world, and thus also a suitable location to 
fight the disease and help the poor. As befits the definition of public goods, this will both help 
the victims, but, by containing the spread of the disease, will also benefit healthy people in the 
country and elsewhere in the world. 
Second, some ODA may be channelled to MICs on the ground that it is indirectly 
instrumental to achieving development progress in LICs through international spillover effects. 
Assistance to MICs to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (e.g. Brazil, India, China…) would, 
besides helping these MICs themselves, help the fight against poverty reduction in certain LICs 
that are heavily affected by climate change (e.g. Bangladesh). Or, if ODA could be instrumental 
in turning Nigeria and Ivory Coast into regional economic powerhouses, that would benefit a 
large number of LICs in that part of Africa. While the first argument focuses on poverty reduction 
to help the poor in some far away developing country, when the rich in that same developing country itself are not 
themselves being similarly taxed.
[18]  We do not argue that ODA should become a source of funding for all major global public goods that have to be 
tackled, for instance climate change mitigation. What we argue is that, whether we like it or not, ODA is already, un-
der present definitions, used to finance some global public goods, for instance the fight against HIV/AIDS, or dealing 
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in MICs with spillovers to other countries, the second argument focuses predominantly on the 
spillover effects. 
4.3	 Knowledge	Transfer
Countries that have successfully crossed the MIC-threshold may hold important 
lessons for countries trying to do the same.  They may for instance have evolved effective 
bureaucratic procedures or introduced legislation or heterodox reform sequences that may be 
an inspiration for reform in LICs.  Such South-South knowledge transfer is the third reason put 
forward for development cooperation with MICs.
A first way to realise knowledge transfers of this type is indirect, with donors cross-
fertilising ideas across the countries they work in. In a world of incomplete information, donors, 
by engaging in MICs, gain useful knowledge that may not be otherwise available to LICs. 
This argument for continued aid to MICs is thus not directly linked to fighting poverty there, 
but to the fact that the knowledge gained by donors working in MICs, for example on social 
safety nets, is a source of knowledge for addressing poverty in LICs. This reasoning is often 
advanced by international agencies, and especially by the World Bank, which has experience in 
most developing countries of the world, and which prides itself as a the Knowledge Bank (see 
for example Kanbur and Sumner, 2011). Three assumptions underscore this argument. The first 
is that there are no alternative less costly ways for LICs to pick up good ideas from MICs. The 
second is that the knowledge gained in MICs is indeed transferable to LICs. The third has to 
do with the donor itself. Has the donor the necessary capacity to institutionally store useful 
knowledge in one country and then transfer it to another? While this may be the case for a large 
multilateral donor or a specialised vertical initiative or UN-agency, it is less likely to be so for a 
small bilateral donor. 
A second way to realise the knowledge transfer is more direct, through trilateral 
cooperation. In this case, experts or policy makers from a MIC are brought in contact with their 
counterparts in a LIC, and appropriate capacity building is organised.  Donors act as a facilitators 
and funders.
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5  how give aiD to mics
The setting in which aid is negotiated, implemented and followed up in MICs differs 
from that of LICs. To start, as indicated before, MICs are typically much less aid dependent 
(lower ODA/GNI ratio), and as a consequence donor leverage through policy dialogue and 
conditionalities is limited. But then, if we are dealing with relatively successful MICs, public 
sector reforms, while undoubtedly still important, will be less of a precondition to development 
than in many LICs. A related point is that most MICs have better access to other sources of 
international finance than LICs, and the knowledge transfer component of ODA will then be 
more important than the finance itself. Finally, institutionally more competent countries will 
also suffer less from the transaction costs of traditional projects and of donor fragmentation.  
In any case, donors, because of their relative small contributions compared to the size of the 
economy and the public sector, will have to be more selective in the needs they decide to support 
(Wood et al., 2011). 
For these reasons, the best way to deliver aid to MICs is likely to differ from best 
practices in LICs). There are important consequences for the prevailing donor discourse with 
respect to aid effectiveness. Some of the principles of the Paris Declaration (PD), designed mainly 
for countries with low levels of human development and a high degree of aid dependence, may 
not be particularly important in a MIC setting. In this section, we will go through the different 
principles of the Paris Declaration and analyse whether they are relevant in the average MIC. 
On the whole we not find the Paris Declaration principles very helpful for devising appropriate 
strategies for MICs. 
Before proceeding further, we wish to repeat that the MIC category is a diverse 
group, and that specific country circumstances call for an implementation of more or less of the 
PD-principles. Bolivia, Romania, Dominican Republic, Morocco and the West Bank and Gaza, 
for example, were all MICs at the time they participated as a pilot country in the World Bank’s 
Comprehensive Development Framework, an approach designed for PRSP countries and thus 
initially for HIPCs and later broadened to LICs. And Nicaragua, another MIC, hosted the Joint 
Country Learning Assessment of the DAC, which served as an input in the Paris Declaration. 
5.1	 Ownership
Given the higher management and administrative capacity of many MICs, national 
authorities will be better equipped to exercise leadership in the development and implementation 
of a national development strategy. They tend to have more ownership over their development 
agenda, more freedom of action and they take up a stronger bargaining position towards donors 
(Schultz, 2009; Wood et al., 2011).
Donors have limited direct influence over government policies, and programme-
based aid modalities with elaborate dialogue structures between the government and the donors 
are less widespread. Sometimes donors achieve more by relying on indirect ways of influencing 
recipient national development strategies. Instead of trying to persuade governments through 
policy dialogue, they may be more influential by working through other stakeholders, such as 
parliaments, academia, the press, NGOs and other non-state actors, who, compared to their 
counterparts in LICs, tend to have higher capacities and sometimes (but not always) more voice 
to express their concerns. For this form of support, donors may also mobilise their own “indirect 
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5.2	 Alignment
Alignment, as conceived by the DAC in the Paris Declaration, consists of three 
elements: policy alignment, system alignment and untying of aid. 
5.2.1  Policy Alignment
An important argument in favour of policy alignment is that it is assumed that the 
recipient government is a  development maximiser, or alternatively that it can be convinced by 
donor pressure to act like one. In MICs the latter is even more problematic than it is in aid-
dependent LICs.  Not surprisingly, MICs are not very concerned about setting up dialogue 
systems with donors (Wood et al., 2011). Reform incentives are more likely to come from the 
desire to attract FDI, regional economic integration and the like, than to  please donors. The 
widespread poverty and high and sustained levels of inequality in many MICs further suggest 
that poverty reduction may not be as high on the government’s priorities list, or that there are 
circumstances that prevent the government to put it high on its agenda. Given the fact that 
donors have less leverage to change recipient government policies, they will have to exercise 
sufficient selectivity to identify prevailing policies they can align with. The World Bank Task 
Force on MICs, for example, reported that one of the reasons why the Bank had become an 
unattractive partner for many MIC countries was the lack of World Bank alignment with country 
development priorities that were more oriented to growth and infrastructure investment than 
to poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs (Cabral et al., 2007). Similarly, in its 
MIC strategy, DFID notes that ideas about stability, growth and security might resonate better 
with MIC priorities and provide more common ground than with the classic donor concerns of 
poverty, exclusion and inequality (DFID, 2004). 
5.2.2  System alignment
As illustrated before, MIC country systems are in general stronger than those of 
LICs, although there are important exceptions. In principle, this gives donors even less reasons 
to bypass government systems than they have in LICs.  But the argument in favour of system 
alignment, in particular in the form of budget support, is more complex. LIC governments 
are crucially lacking in fiscal resources to provide public goods, whereas donors make large 
contributions compared to the government´s budget.  This leads to a mutual dependence: 
the best way for donors to get results with their sizeable budgets is to work with and through 
governments, and the only way for cash strapped governments to realise their objectives is to 
work with donors. In MICs the assumption of resource scarcity and of mutual dependence in 
achieving objectives is harder to make. We would argue that in MICs the importance of aid does 
not lie so much in providing finance, or in leveraging much needed public sector reforms, as in 
the transfer of knowhow, and in the soft power of donor practices. It follows that project aid may 
well emerge as the most appropriate aid modality for these countries.. Of course, a choice for 
such lower modalities can and should be combined with the highest possible degree of system 
alignment and the avoidance of unnecessary parallel systems. 
Because MICs have other sources of international and national finance, and because 
they are less dependent on aid as a share of GNI, it is not surprising to find that MICs are less 
concerned with the volatility of aid flows and predictability of disbursements (Wood et al. 2011). 
This is another factor that reduces the pressure on donors for explicit alignment exercises. 
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knowledge are often key. Donor efforts to strengthen national M&E systems, among others by 
aligning their own M&E exercises, will be particularly appropriate. 
5.2.3  Tied aid
The attempts of the DAC member states to untie aid have a longer history than the 
Paris Declaration itself. Different sets of concern are the basis of the quest to untie aid: 
1. On the recipient side: the efficiency and effectiveness of aid. 
Studies looking for effects of tying on recipient countries find that tied aid reduces the 
effectiveness and efficiency of aid through different channels (DAC, 2009b): 
a.  Direct costs: aid-financed goods and services sourced in the donor country 
may be consistently more expensive than those available to the recipient from 
alternative sources. The well-known study of Jepma (1991) arrives at an excess cost 
in the range of 15-30%. Later findings based on procurement prices under tied aid 
contracts, interviews with project managers and country-based examples largely 
reconfirm Jepma’s conclusion and estimate an over-pricing of more than 20%, and 
even 40% or more for food aid. 
b.  Indirect costs: under the pressure of business interests in the donor country, 
donor  agency  and  recipient  government  judgements  get  clouded,  leading  to 
the support for unprofitable economic projects, to excessive import content, to 
inappropriate technologies, emphasis on the wrong sectors, and the like. Arguably 
these indirect costs of aid tying are more important than the direct costs. Often 
they lead to complete failure of the investment projects that are supported
c.  Debt worries: because tied aid is often partly financed with loans, recipient 
external debt sustainability is also an issue, especially in light of the previous point.  
Historically, a considerable part of the debt crisis in LICs that has been overcome at 
high cost through HIPC and MDRI initiatives, was caused by ill-considered donor 
lending to tied projects.
d.  Finally,  and  also  stressed  in  the  Paris  Declaration,  tied  aid  undermines 
ownership. 
2. On the donor side, several reasons have historically been put forward to defend tying 
practices. These do not, however, withstand the scrutiny of economic theory and by 
empirical evidence:
a.  The export competitiveness issue. On the donor side, the primary intention 
of tying aid is to favour suppliers in the donor economy, relative to the rest of the 
world.  Studies indicate however that the real impact of tying on donor exports is 
quite limited, but that these limited commercial benefits might be important for 
particular interest groups (DAC, 2009b). In fact, where aid flows are found to have 
a significant positive impact on exports, this is even more so as the proportion of 
untied aid increases with time, an effect known as the goodwill effect: as a result of 
untied aid flows, the recipient feels more inclined to buy goods and services directly 
from the donor (DAC, 2009b). In summary, aid tying bestows economic rents to 
powerful business lobbies at the expense of the collective interest of the donor 
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b.  Political support for aid. A concern often voiced by those defending tying 
practices is that untying could result in a loss of domestic support for aid overall. The 
DAC evaluation of untied aid (Clay et al., 2008) does not find evidence to support 
these concerns. Another study (DAC, 2009b) even warns for the opposite effect, as 
the popular support for aid may be jeopardised following cases of aid malpractice. In 
the past a number of political scandals had an important impact on public support, 
policy making and aid untying in the UK (Pergau dam scandal in Malaysia) Norway 
(Ship Export Campaign). In Belgium a book on “white elephants” funded with aid 
money led to a public outcry, and to a reshuffling at the top of the aid Ministry (De 
Coninck, 1996).
c.  Effect on employment. Finally, a number of studies analysed the effect of tying 
on the net increase in employment and found no positive effect (DAC, 2009b). 
At the micro-level, the benefits of untying have been recently illustrated in the case 
of Afghanistan (Heady et al., 2011). On the basis of a survey undertaken in Kabul, the authors 
estimate that with the “Afghan First” approach, through which contracts are awarded to local 
registered Afghan enterprises, $441m in aid contracts created 118.000 jobs between 2006 and 
the end of March 2011. At the same time, since a business must be registered before it can bid 
on an international tender, these contracts are generating millions in badly needed local taxes 
(Gilmore, 2011). 
Aid  tying  is  a  form  of  export  protectionism,  and  like  the  more  usual  import 
protectionism, highly contagious. If one country starts tying it´s aid, others tend to follow 
suit. And if all countries act this way, then everyone loses. For the same supplier who gains a 
lucrative export market through tying of his national aid programme becomes in turn the victim 
of identical tying policies in other donor countries. The underlying collective action problem 
must be counteracted by international agreements to collectively untie aid. This is exactly the 
role that the DAC has performed over time, and with a good measure of success.
The  definition  of  tied  aid  currently  used  dates  back  to  the  1987  DAC  Guiding 
Principles for Associated Financing and Tied and Partially Untied ODA (DAC, 1987). After a 
decade of voluntary, though not always consistent, reporting on the tying status of aid, the 
DAC members agreed in 2001 on a recommendation to untie most categories of aid to LDCs 
(DAC, 2001). The 2001 Recommendation excludes technical assistance and food aid and is not 
applicable to non-LDC MICs.  In 2008 the coverage of the 2001 Recommendation was extended 
to non-LDC HIPCs19. The Paris Declaration refers to the 2001 Recommendation and includes a 
further qualitative commitment to make progress on untying aid. As a result of all this pressure, 
the degree of untying to both LDC and non-LDCs has increased between 1999-2001 and 2005-
2007, from 57% to 83% for LDCs and from 49% to 70% for non-LDCs. 
[19]  These countries include the following MICs: Bolivia, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Honduras, Nicaragua and the 
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Given the selected coverage of the DAC Recommendation, it could be expected that 
untying would be selectively implemented in these countries covered by the recommendation. 
Table 15 shows that this is not necessarily the case:
Table 15: DAC donor countries: untied aid as percentage of donor ODA in 2007
Donor
Untied aid
as % of donor aid to 
all DCs
as % of donor aid to 
LDCs
as % of donor aid to 
non-LDCs
Luxemburg 100 100 100
UK 100 100 100
Norway 99,9 100 99,9
Switzerland 98,2 96,5 98,8
Australia 95,8 97,6 95,1
Ireland 95,1 100 89,2
Belgium 92,3 99,7 86,6
France 89,8 87,9 90,3
Denmark 87,6 94 83,5
Sweden 86,3 97 83,1
Finland 84,9 97,5 75,3
New Zealand 84,7 81,3 86,3
Netherlands 77,8 98,9 70,5
Austria 76,1 90 75,4
Japan 75,2 86,3 72,5
Germany 73,2 80,1 72
Canada 68,8 84,9 59,5
Spain 66,5 75,7 65,3
USA 62,9 74,8 58,5
Italy 52,2 52,5 52,2
Portugal 38,2 91,1 23,6





For donors taken as a group we observe that aid to LDCs is relatively less tied. At 
the individual country level, this is however not necessarily the case. At the top of the ranking, 
we see that the frontrunners untie their aid to all developing countries. Further down the rank-
ing however, we see that donors become more selective in the countries to which they untie their 
aid. The most extreme examples here are Greece and Portugal which largely untie their aid to 
the LDCs, in line with the DAC Recommendation, while leaving the rest of their aid largely tied. 
These countries thus apply the letter of the Recommendation, but do not follow the broader 
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5.3	 Harmonisation
The Paris Declaration enumerates a number of commitments under the heading of 
harmonisation: 
5.3.1  Common arrangements and simplified procedures
In those cases where policy alignment with the government is not considered ap-
propriate, notwithstanding the fact that there is adequate government capacity, and therefore 
system alignment in itself would not pose a problem,  it might be still worthwhile agreeing with 
other donors on common arrangements and simplified procedures for planning, funding, dis-
bursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting, so as to lessen the burden on the recipient 
government. It should however be assessed whether, given the higher capacity, the donor ef-
forts required to coordinate and harmonise outweigh the potential benefits for the recipient (see 
e.g. DFID, 2004). 
In countries and sectors where the ODA/GNI ratio is low, and where the provision 
of basic services does not depend on international financing, there are only limited incentives for 
MIC governments to develop elaborate programme-based approaches to manage and coordi-
nate aid. The balance of potential benefits: greater control over external resources, simplifica-
tion of procedures and the opportunity to link aid more directly to the development of ministry 
capacities, must be set against  possible risks: more direct influence of the donor community, 
an increase in workload of ministry personnel, potentially less predictable financial resources. 
From their side, donors also need to judge, on a case-by-case basis, whether the benefits are 
worth the trouble. 
That SWAps rather than full budget support might be a win-win-solution for do-
nors and recipients is suggested by the SWAps that are implemented in Brazil, together with 
the MDBs. Brazil uses a SWAp to align MDB support to its programmes and systems (Cabral et 
al., 2007). Other MICs have less appetite for this sort of donor arrangements (Wood et al., 2011; 
DFID and AECI, 2004). 
Coordinating missions to the field and sharing institutional or fiduciary assess-
ments or monitoring exercises might be less pressing from the viewpoint of the recipient be-
cause of the higher capacity. From the perspective of the donor however, it may help to improve 
understanding of the country’s context, create a common understanding across donors and har-
monise dialogue with the partner country. 
In MICs, there is often a fledgling capacity to supply high quality consultancy ser-
vices, produced by local consultants, research institutions and academics. Such studies should 
be where possible commissioned locally, not only to reduce the high cost of studies carried out 
by donor country consultants, but also to boast local expertise, and to provide an incentive for 
further improvements in quality. 
5.3.2  Division of Labour
International cross-country division of labour among donors might have an impact 
on MICs that is excessive. Indeed, if donors agree to reduce the number of partner countries, 
and set a minimum size for the ODA budget in any given country, they may well tend to throw 
out countries where they have relatively modest but effective aid programmes, especially if 
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decrease as a consequence of this evolution, it might also drain away more experienced donors.   
At the national level, MICs have less appetite for elaborate arrangements for a 
formal division of labour among donors (Wood et al., 2011). Some however, e.g. South Africa, 
do take it up more strongly in their relation with donors. Their governments formulate more 
strongly the partners they prefer in their collaboration with donors. 
5.3.3  Internal harmonization
Other domains of international cooperation that do not count as ODA may be just 
as important for developing countries as aid, if not more so. This argument applies to all devel-
oping countries, but with special force to MICs. Efforts to help MICs should therefore cover all 
policies affecting them. This means they should involve more than the main aid department or 
ministry, and endeavour to ensure consistency across departments. Besides external harmo-
nisation with other donors, an internal harmonisation within the donor government is there-
fore called for to improve the development effectiveness of the totality of government policies 
towards MICs. The Centre for Global Development measures how rich countries government 
policies affect development in poorer countries with the Commitment to Development Index 
(CDI). This index is interesting in this regard, because it tries to assess donor consistency in this 
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6  Donor strategies
With poverty alleviation being the overarching objective for aid, it is generally as-
sumed that aid will overwhelmingly flows towards the poorest countries. In many donor poli-
cies this is also the official rhetoric. Reality shows however that 42.2% of all ODA goes to MICs. 
Because of an official discourse that mainly emphasises poverty and the poorest countries, and 
because of the diversity among MICs, donors generally do not have a separate MIC strategy. In 
this first section we will look at a number of donor countries and the country classifications they 
use. 
Before we look at the different donor countries studied, it is important to note that 
the country categories reflect: 
•  On the donor side: objectives pursued through aid, historical relations with par-
ticular countries, future goals of the cooperation…
•  The characteristics of the recipient: poverty level, public sector capacity, gov-
ernment willingness, security situation, economic prospects, geographical loca-
tion, strategic importance…
6.1	 European	Commission
In a speech given at the informal Council meeting of Development Ministers in 
Brussels, Commissioner Andris Piebalgs proposes country diversification as one of his six ele-
ments to increase the impact of EU development cooperation. Although the EU has to be en-
gaged in all developing countries, “the specific nature and quality of the EU engagement will 
have to differ depending on the regional or country context” (Piebalgs, 2011). He suggests to 
differentiate cooperation based on four basic country categories: 
1.  The first category covers countries where financial aid is no longer the most 
relevant cooperation instrument. Common interests would not only allow for joint 
partnerships in trade, regional cooperation, migration and so on; it would also in-
volve promotion of joint undertakings in addressing global challenges such as in-
ternational security, global health and environmental protection. 
2.  A second category would comprise countries where the enabling conditions for 
inclusive growth (security, good governance and social inclusion) are met. In those 
countries EU could focus its resources on growth supporting sectors (energy, infra-
structure, agriculture, aid for trade…) in close cooperation with the private sectors 
in the EU and partner countries alike. 
3.  In countries of category three the enabling conditions for inclusive growth are 
not yet met. Here EU support might focus on human development, notably health, 
education, social protection, and governance. At the same time there should be 
also support for economic growth and private sector development where possible. 
4.  A final category focuses on countries in situations of fragility. Here EU resources 
would have to focus on effectively linking security, governance and development. 
6.2	 Netherlands
The Dutch government introduced country profiles in its 2007 Policy Note “Our 
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to acknowledge the differences between partner countries, to clarify the underlying choices and 
to better focus efforts. Country profiles were based on: (i) the main characteristics of and situ-
ation in the country, (ii) the policy effort the Netherlands intends to make and (iii) the specific 
needs of partners. Three country profiles were defined.
1.  Accelerated achievement of MDGs.
Countries in this profile have a reasonable level of stability, improving governance, 
and are relatively dependent on aid. They are lagging behind in their contribution 
to the achievement of the MDGs, but could catch up if an extra effort is made in 
close cooperation with the government and other donors. In a number of countries, 
the actual or potential security problem is recognized, but it is not considered a 
dominant problem. The focus of cooperation will be on a Paris Declaration style 
(alignment, harmonization, DoL) cooperation. 
Countries: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenia, Mali, 
Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen, 
Zambia. 
2.  Security and development
This profile applies to countries with a pressing security problem or sharp division 
in society that could potentially spill over into conflict. Because of this, these coun-
tries are generally unable to achieve the MDGs in the near future. Efforts will be 
geared towards the creation of the right conditions to take these countries closer 
to achieving the MDGs, with a focus on basic services. What concerns the Paris 
Declaration, focus will be on a minimisation of transaction costs. 
Countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, DRC, Guatemala, Kosovo, Pakistan, 
Palestinian Territories, Sudan. 
3.  Broad-based relationship
The last profile covers countries that are closest to the topic of this background 
study. It consists of partner countries that enjoy solid economic growth, are making 
progress on the MDGs and have already achieved MIC-status or are likely to do so 
in the foreseeable future. As a consequence, these countries are evolving towards 
a broader range of relationships and developing cooperation no longer lies at the 
core of bilateral relations. The Dutch development partnership will be scaled back 
and succeeded by other types of bilateral relationships. Three focuses are listed for 
cooperation with these countries: 
• Broadening: Areas flanking development, including economic, political, cultural 
relations as well as climate policy and security will be targeted to ensure that 
development is broadened
• Specific interventions aimed at achieving the MDGs: Generally, a multilateral 
channel or an international partner might be the preferred option for this pur-
pose. 
• Uncertainty and institutional weaknesses: Generally, these countries will take 
more leadership over their development process, limiting the possible interfer-
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ting up a development programme: (i) the uncertainty whether the economy and 
prosperity will continue to grow and (ii) institutional weaknesses that are not 
necessarily solved with economic growth. 
Countries: Egypt, Georgia, Indonesia, Moldova, Vietnam, South Africa, Suriname. 
Following the 2010 elections and the Scientific Council Report “Less pretention, 
more ambition: a Dutch cooperation that will make a difference”, the new Dutch government is 
currently in the process of reducing the number of partner countries from 33 to 15 (van Lieshout 
et al., 2010; Minbuza, 2011). 
The process started with all 33 embassies being asked to explain how and if the 
four sector priorities (peace and security, water and sanitation, food security, and sexual repro-
duction) could be implemented in the country in which they work. After an assessment of the 
answer 18 countries were excluded as partner country. 
In the selection, the three UMICs (South Africa, Suriname and Colombia) were ex-
cluded and only 5 (Ghana, Yemen, Palestinian Territories, Sudan and Indonesia) of the 17 LMICs 
were retained. Although this selection was not always based on strictly objective criteria, and 
political considerations certainly played a role, a criterion that was used and made a difference 
was the capacity of countries to generate their own income through taxes.
The three profiles listed above will remain, but a number of countries have been 
rescheduled: 
  Profile 1: Benin, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda 
  Profile 2: Afghanistan, Burundi, Palestinian Territories, Sudan and Yemen 
  Profile 3 : Bangladesh, Ghana, Indonesia and Kenya
For 15 countries20 an exit strategy will be prepared and for another 3 that were in the 
third category (Colombia, Vietnam and South-Africa) a new transition-facility will be set up in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation. This facility will 
be “a country specific instrument for (nearly)-MICs to facilitate the transition from a bilateral 
development relation to an economic cooperation with mutual benefits. This facility is therefore 
directed towards improving the investment climate in sectors with opportunities for Dutch com-
panies.” The facility is planned to be temporary, two years. At the end of September 2011, the 
Dutch minister will provide more information to parliament (Vice Versa, 2011) 
6.3	 DFID
DFID recently carried out a bilateral aid review. As a result, aid will be focused on 
less countries. While in 2008/09 140 countries received some form of UK bilateral aid, there were 
only 43 countries with significant bilateral aid programs. The review reduced this number to 27, 
and mainly MICs were dropped (DFID, 2011). 
Prior to the review, the Minister announced that aid to China and Russia would 
be stopped. The remaining countries were considered in terms of (i) development need, (ii) the 
likely effectiveness of assistance and (iii) strategic fit with UK government priorities. The first 
two considerations were brought together in a needs-effectiveness score. In this approach, the 
‘need’ component is based on the Human Development Index (inverted), a measure of the coun-
[20]  Bolivia, Burkina Faso, DRC, Egypt, Georgia, Guatemala, Kosovo, Moldova, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
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try’s fragility (Country Indicator for Foreign Policy – Failed and Fragile States Indicator (CIFP)) 
and the number of people living under $2 a day. The effectiveness component is based on the 
CPIA:
  HDI*CIFP-FFS*Population living under $2 a day0.2*CPIA
As a result of these three considerations, 16 of the 43 countries are being dropped: 4 
out of 22 LICs, 9 out of 17 LMICs and 3 out of 4 UMICs. Of the remaining countries, 19 are in the 
upper quartile when ranked according to the needs-effectiveness score (India, Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Uganda, DRC, Afghanistan, Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, 
Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Yemen, Ghana, Sudan, Malawi and Zambia) and 2 were in the second 
quartile (Nepal and Liberia). The remaining 6 countries (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Zimbabwe, the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, Somalia and South Africa) are kept because the Minister be-
lieves that DFID can make a significant impact. 
In MICs from which Britain withdraws, a high rate economic growth is appar-
ently an important consideration, suggesting that aid programmes are no longer required (e.g. 
Vietnam). In LICs, limited British comparative advantage (Niger and the Gambia) or limited ab-
sorptive capacity (Burundi) are put forward.
6.4	 Germany
Since  the  unification  of  both  Germanies  the  German  Ministry  for  Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has repeatedly reduced the number of partner countries. 
During one of these concentration efforts, MICs and small-islands states were dropped. The 
most recent major change took place with the 2009 change of government. With this review a 
reduction to 50 partner countries was aimed using 5 criteria (Meyer, 2011): 
•  Good governance and development orientation (Bertelsmann Transformation  
  Index...)
•  Needs (HDI, % of absolute poor...)
•  Significance of German support (CPA, division of Labour...)
•  Sources of risk (failed states...)
•  Strategic partnerships (Global Public Goods)
In contrast to DFID, BMZ does not aggregate these criteria in a composite index/
quantitative ranking. 
Besides a review of the list of partner countries, the new coalition agreement also 
foresaw a review of German cooperation with larger emerging economies. Different demands 
are raised by emerging countries who are now major users of natural resources, new donors, 
increasingly important trading partners, but still are home to a majority of the world´s poor. At 
the same time, other German Ministries engage with the larger MICs. The German government 
considers it important to continue engagement in the larger emerging economies to achieve 
international commitments (e.g. MDGs), shared economic and political goals, support sustain-
able development and to transfer technological solutions and know-how. 
For cooperation with these emerging economies, BMZ, in collaboration with the 
German Development Institute (DIE), developed in 2004 the concept of “anchor countries”. 
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powerful countries might play, both positive and negative, in relation to other countries in their 
region (Harris et al., 2009). The criteria for selecting those countries are (Meyer, 2011): 
•  Ability to play creative role in “global governance” (e.g. G20), 
•  Relevance for achieving the international MDGs
•  Size of national economy is of global relevance
•  Key role in regional integration processes/cooperation. 
Although DIE listed 15 potential candidates, the 2004 Anchor Country Strategy 
was initially limited to nine countries (China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Brazil and Mexico)21 .
Cooperation with these countries will focus on two aspects: (i) cooperation in the 
countries through bilateral programs and projects, and (ii) supra-national cooperation with 
emerging economies as part of shaping regional and global development agendas. Finally, the 
partnerships with anchor countries create a need to develop specific cooperation instruments : 
•  Financing needs become less relevant; need for adapted financing instruments 
(credit, composite financing) 
•  Capacity building, further education/vocational training, (integrated) experts, 
paid TA/consultancies 
•  Dialogue programmes that transcend national borders, international exchange 
of experience and networking
•  Triangular cooperation
•  “Emerging  Economies  Fund”  funded  from  repayments  of  loans  granted  to 
emerging economies and that could be used for further cooperation with MICs. 
6.5	 Sweden
In Sweden, country categories were introduced in 2007, together with a reduction in partner 
countries to increase aid effectiveness (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2007b). 
In a first phase, the amount of partner countries was reduced based on an analysis of 20 indica-
tors. Four questions were central in this analysis: 
1.  How extensive is poverty and where are the needs greatest? 
2.  What expectations can we have regarding the effectiveness of our aid? 
3.  Is democratic development going in the right direction and do we have the po-
tential to influence it? 
4.  How can Sweden help? 
The overall outcome of this process was a stronger focus on Africa, Europe, peace and security 
and democracy and human rights. 
Countries that were considered as regular partner countries were divided into three categories: 
1.  Countries with which Sweden will conduct long-term development cooperation 
focused on poverty reduction.
[21]  The following countries listed by DIE did not make it to the list: Turkey, Thailand, Argentina, Russia, Iran, and 
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Countries: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
2.  Countries in conflict and/or post-conflict situations with which Sweden will 
conduct cooperation focused on peace and security. This will require special and 
flexible measures.
Countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, DRC, Guatemala, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Timor-Leste, Somalia, Sudan and West Bank and Gaza, 
3.  Countries in Eastern Europe with which Sweden will conduct reform coopera-
tion to facilitate EU integration.   
Countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine. 
Beyond these partner countries, Sweden listed a number of countries where other 
forms of cooperation will be implemented
4.  Countries where regular state-to-state cooperation is not possible or desirable, 
but in which Sweden will conduct alternative measures to promote democracy and 
human rights. 
5.  Countries where Swedish development cooperation will be phased out, but in 
which Sweden will conduct selective cooperation to ensure that Swedish involve-
ment can take new forms.
Countries: Botswana, China, India, Indonesia, Namibia, South Africa, Vietnam. 
6.  Countries to be phased out but where relations will be promoted in other ways 
than through bilateral development cooperation.  
6.6	 Specific	aid	instruments
Only in Sweden could we find a specific aid instrument which is mainly targeted 
towards MICs: Partner Driven Cooperation (PDC) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2007a). 
For countries of category 5, it should make up the bulk of cooperation. 
With PDC, Sweden tries to set up self-supporting relationships between Swedish 
actors and actors in low and medium income countries. In this way, PDC should form a bridge 
in the transition from long-term development cooperation towards strengthened and deepened 
bilateral relations once development cooperation is phased out. PDC can be conducted in vari-
ous areas and relates to various types of cooperation: cultural, economic, research, institutional, 
local government and regional, and between CSOs. The targeted Swedish actors are companies, 
government agencies, universities and higher education institutions, and trade unions. 
Aid is intended to act as a catalyst and is temporary, limited to three years. After 
that time, the relationship should be able to live on without financial support from the develop-
ment cooperation budget. 
An  example  of  a  programme  that  might  become  a  successful  form  of  PDC  is 
DemoEnvironment (Danielson, 2010). In this programme, companies, government agencies, 
municipalities and institutions apply for funding for demonstration projects and feasibility stud-
ies in the areas of sustainable urban development and renewable energy. The idea is that these 
funds should be able to function as a catalyst and that the projects would be financed over time 
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7  conclusions 
In 2011, 61% of the world´s poor live in non-fragile MICs (table 11). This suggests 
that the 42.2% of ODA bilateral DAC donors devoted to such countries in 2008-2009 (table 10) 
is not excessive, even if the only objective is poverty alleviation. On the contrary, apart from 
the fact that many poor people live there, the effectiveness of aid in such countries may well be 
higher. A powerful counterargument is associated with Paul Collier´s thesis about the Bottom 
Billion, a billion people living in countries without any prospect for escaping poverty within one 
generation. His argument can be interpreted as a plea in favour of channelling almost all ODA to 
a set of underperforming countries, most of which happen to be LICs (table 13). The argument in 
favour of aid to MICs is also static. As explained, the dynamics of growth are such that the pre-
sent distribution of the poor is rapidly and significantly shifting towards LICs, and in particular 
towards SSA LICs. According to some estimates, by 2015 almost 60% of the world poor will live 
in SSA (table 14). 
Apart from the poverty argument, two other, mutually related, arguments have 
been made in the literature in favour of MICs: global public goods and knowledge transfers. 
Again, these are general arguments, and it must be shown whether they apply to given donors 
and recipient countries. 
We have expressed some reservations about the appropriateness of some aspects 
of the Paris Declaration. The Paris Declaration was inspired by a different set of countries and 
problems: countries that have weak public sectors, are highly aid dependent, and cannot afford 
to ignore donor advice. In devising an appropriate mix of instruments for MICs, the discourse 
that has emerged around the Paris Declaration can be quite misleading. Particularly the empha-
sis on higher aid modalities and associated technical assistance and policy dialogue is uncon-
vincing. We would guess that in many MICs projects (preferably “new style projects” that are as 
aligned as possible to partner country systems) and SWAps are appropriate, whereas sector or 
general budget support much less so. 
A number of the donors whose MIC strategies are summarised above see ODA to 
MICs as a stepping stone to a post-aid, fully reciprocal relationship. For this reason they move 
to less concessional financial instruments, and bring in the private sector. Among several chal-
lenges, two stand out. First this step must be taken without falling in the trap of aid tying. The 
literature that was summarised above does not contain any convincing argument that aid tying 
is a constructive way of preparing a more mature reciprocal future relationship with MICs. In 
fact, tying almost inevitably leads to donor private business lobbies receiving economic rents in 
ways that are harmful to the economic interests of the recipient country. The second challenge is 
that such aid must be temporary. Some donors set a fairly short time limit on the activities they 
sponsor with such transitional aid in MICs. But it is far from evident how ODA may constitute 
seed money for future transactions that will have no element of subsidy attached to them. 
In aid to MICs, some of the more thoughtful donors try to bring in other Ministries 
and universities. The argument extends to CSOs. This makes sense, inasmuch as the importance 
of the financial transfer in ODA diminishes and the importance of the transfer of knowledge in-
creases. It also opens up new perspectives for the collaboration with universities and NGOs. In 
this context the idea of “extensive” rather than “intensive” complementarity  between direct 
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Finally, it is good to recall that he concept of MICs covers a large group of countries 
that share an income per capita above a certain threshold but that are otherwise very different 
from each other. In the donor documents that we could consult refined profiles are being pro-
posed that go beyond the distinction between LICs and MICs. In fact, none of the donors we 
studies relied solely, or even primarily, on this particular characteristic of recipient countries in 
formulating their country strategies.Development cooperation with miDDle-income countries   IOB WorkingPaper 2011-11 • 47 
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